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Abstract: 
 
International organizations and NGOs promote transparency as a necessary condition 
for enhancing accountability and curbing corruption. Transparency is predicted to 
deter corruption in part by increasing the opportunities for inter-institutional oversight 
and formal accountability, but also by expanding the possibilities for societal 
accountability, i.e. for citizens to monitor, scrutinize and hold public office holders 
accountable. While the societal accountability mechanism linking transparency and 
good government is often implied, it contains a number of assumptions seldom 
examined empirically. This study theoretically unpacks and explores empirically how 
transparency may influence good government via the mechanism of societal 
accountability, that is, by inciting reactions and responses from citizens. Using data 
compiled by the Quality of Government Institute, we show that increased 
transparency prompts different public reactions in countries with comparatively 
higher levels of corruption than in low corrupt countries. The data indicate that in 
corrupt countries, transparency, counter to many predictions, erodes political trust but 
stimulates civic engagement. The findings suggest that transparency may incite 
discontent and civic mobilization in the short term, contributing to greater 
accountability and better government in the long term. 
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Introduction1 
 “Let it be impossible that anything should be done which is unknown to the nation—prove to it that 
you neither intends to deceive nor to surprise—you take away all the weapons of discontent. The public 
will repay with usury the confidence you repose in it” (Bentham [1839] 1999, 30). 
 
As the quote by Jeremy Bentham indicates, the conviction that transparency induces 
good behavior in incumbents, and that this behavior will enhance the legitimacy of 
office holders, has deep historical roots. In the last decade, however, the transparency 
movement has gained momentum; international organizations and NGOs advocate 
transparency as a necessary condition for better government quality, greater 
accountability and limiting the scope for corruption (UN-HABITAT & Transparency 
International 2004; Islam 2006; Kaufmann et al. 2002; Kurtzman et al. 2004; IMF 
2001; UNODC 2004; CEPA 2009) as well as bringing about economic growth 
Kurtzman et al. 2004; Sielgle 2001). In addition to these predicted beneficial 
consequences, advocates also increasingly point to transparency and the right to know 
as a fundamental human right (Birkinshaw 2008; UN 1948).  
Although the link between transparency and better government institutions has 
become conventional wisdom and permeates the thinking of international 
organizations and development organizations alike, our understanding of this link 
remains incomplete. The dominant theory behind transparency’s beneficial influence 
on government institutions is its potential to deter abuses of power because 
transparency increases opportunities for inter-institutional oversight, i.e. increases the 
risk of detection and consequently also punishment. More recently, Timothy Besley 
(2006, 98ff) and others have questioned the potential of government offices to hold 
one another accountable and instead propose the political agency model, which 
instead assigns the role of principal to the public via the mechanism of electoral 
accountability. Empirical research suggests, however, that electoral accountability has 
done little to reduce corruption. A third model linking increased transparency to better 
governance is societal accountability, i.e. that citizens monitor, scrutinize and hold 
public office holders accountable via channels other than regular, competitive 
elections. In this paper, we explore theoretically and empirically this latter model. A 
number of case studies document that citizens and civil society organizations in fact 
can and do succeed in bringing abuses to light and bringing about sanctions (Abers 
1998; Abers 2003; Avritzer 2006; Baiocchi 2003; Batista Calvancanti 2006; Davidson 
2007; Lemos-Nelson and Zaverucha 2006; Pande 2008). Yet while the societal 
accountability mechanism linking transparency and good government is often 
implied, its various underlying assumptions are seldom unpacked and explored 
empirically. In particular, we focus on the first and crucial link in this relationship 
between transparency and better government, namely whether and how citizens and 
civil society react at all to an increased availability of information on government 
activities.  
In doing so, this study contributes to the growing literature on the link between 
transparency and improved government institutions. Many studies arguing that 
transparency plays an important role in reducing government corruption and 
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improving institutional quality do not specify how and when this beneficial effect is 
likely to materialize. In addition, recent studies have advanced a more nuanced 
debate, revealing an ambiguous picture of the effects of transparency, with some 
authors suggesting that transparency in fact does not necessarily promote better 
decision making, less corruption and more effectiveness (Bastida & Benito 2007; 
Kolstad & Wiig 2009; MacCoun 2006, Bac 2001). Others point to the important 
conditions, such the public being able to take in and use information, that need to be 
in place for transparency to promote societal accountability (Naurin & Lindstedt 
2010). However, the more fundamental questions of whether the public actually reacts 
either attitudinally or behaviorally when transparency increases, and what role these 
reactions might play in promoting societal accountability, are less explored.   
In this paper we explore theoretically and empirically the potential for 
transparency to bring about better government via the mechanism of societal 
accountability. While the main aim is to elaborate a model for this dynamic, we also 
test some of the crucial parts of the model using country comparative data. More 
specifically, we examine the influence of greater disclosure to the workings of 
government on two possible public reactions key to a longer-term process of 
institutional reform: institutional trust and civic engagement. While both of these 
indicators contain ambiguities, we argue that they complement one another in a way 
that helps to shed light on the overarching question at hand. Many authors have 
followed Bentham’s lead in claiming that transparency breeds confidence in 
governing institutions (Warren 2006). Our analyses add to the growing doubt 
regarding the validity of these claims. This paper therefore also seeks to contribute to 
the on-going debates surrounding the concept of institutional trust. We suggest that 
increased government transparency, in sharp contrast to most other types of 
improvements in government institutions, may reduce rather than increased 
institutional trust. The results of the analyses lend some support for the contention that 
transparency enables societal accountability, though we also note that additional 
research is needed.   
 
The paper proceeds as follows. First, it develops the theoretical model linking 
transparency to institutional quality focusing on its potential power as facilitator of 
societal accountability. The following section first outlines the overall theoretical 
framework under consideration and then focuses on the two potential micro 
foundations for societal accountability: public indignation and civic engagement. The 
fourth section discusses concepts and measurements, while the fifth section presents 
the results of the analyses of transparency on political attitudes and behavior in a 
country. The final section discusses the implication of our results for understanding 
the societal accountability enhancing effects of transparency.  
   
 
Transparency , Societal Accountability and Good Government 
The arguments regarding the potential benefits of increased transparency are well 
established (OECD 2001; Islam 2006, Kurtzman et al. 2004; Siegle 2001). Several 
studies suggest that transparency can reduce corruption (Rose-Ackerman 1999; 
Reinikka and Svensson 2005; Montinola & Jackman 2002; Gerring & Thacker 2004; 
IMF 2001; UNODC 2004; Kaufmann et al. 2002; Lindstedt & Naurin 2010). 
Transparency is often seen a necessary component of quality of government and 
therefore a key to increasing political trust (Blind 2006). Several studies document 
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that corruption can reduce institutional trust (Chang & Chu 2006; Anderson & 
Tverdova 2003; Selingson 2002; Warren 2006), and to the extent that transparency 
aids in reducing corruption, it may have an indirect positive influence on institutional 
trust. However, transparency is often expected to both deter corruption and increase 
trust more or less simultaneously (Kaufmann 2005). The Committee of Experts on 
Public Administration, for example, recommends that member states “review their 
governance and public administration institutional arrangements, structures, systems, 
and practices and make them more conducive to civic engagement, transparency and 
accountability as key components of trust, which is critical in achieving the 
Millennium Development Goals” (CEPA 2009:40). Studies conclude that to increase 
institutional trust, countries should focus on improving institutions to make them 
more impartial (Rothstein & Stolle 2007; Teorell 2009), more efficient (Lühiste 2006; 
Mishler & Rose 2001), or more transparent (Blind 2006; CEPA 2009; Morrone et al 
2009).  
Although the first two recommendations regarding impartiality and efficienty 
are in line with the notion of promoting better perceptions of government 
performance, the prescription regarding transparency is more complex. On the one 
hand, transparency is an integral part of good government quality and can therefore 
also be expected to establish confidence amongst citizens that political institutions are 
acting legally and appropriately. On the other hand, however, transparency can also 
reveal improper or illegal government practices and potentially diminish trust in the 
political system.  
Recently, studies have revealed a number of costs and problems associated with 
increased transparency (Bauhr & Nasiritousi 2010; Bastida & Benito 2007; Fenster 
2006; Lindstedt & Naurin forthcoming; Kolstad & Wiig 2009; MacCoun 2006; 
Stasavage 2004). Studies call in question the benefits of transparency for improving 
government decision making and reducing corruption and point at the important 
conditions that have to be fulfilled for transparency to produce the expected benefits. 
Jonathan Fox provides one explanation for why transparency may fail to induce rule 
of law: “If the power of transparency is based on the ‘power of shame’, then its 
influence over the really shameless could be quite limited” (Fox 2007, 665). And 
‘shamelessness’ tends to flourish when impunity prevails. Rather than transparency 
being portrayed as a sure way to better government quality, these studies emphasize 
that transparency may not automatically provide the expected benefits; transparency 
does not by itself, in other words, eliminate the abuse of public power for private gain 
(Olken 2004, Lindstedt and Naurin forthcoming, Bac 2001).2 
Sunlight may, as Brandeis claimed, disinfect in some cases, while in other 
respects it may distort, and in some cases have little or no effect on political 
operations whatever. Under what circumstances and via what mechanisms might, 
then, transparency lead to reducing corruption and bringing public institutions more in 
line with public interests? Fox provides a concise, useful point of departure, outlining 
two important mechanisms, one inter-institutional and the other involving extra-
institutional actors such as civil society and the media. 
 
…the power of transparency, defined in terms of the tangible impacts of the 
public spotlight, depends in practice on how other actors respond. These 
                                                 
2 for a more comprehensive review of these studies see Bauhr and Nasiritousi ( 2010).  
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reactive responses can be indirect, when the mass media, opposition 
political parties, or voters make an issue of newly revealed abuses; or they 
can be direct, as when the judicial or elected authorities make binding 
decisions in response (Fox 2007, 666). 
 
Transparency grants political and public institutions greater insight into one another’s 
operations, thereby increasing their capacity to hold one another accountability, what 
Fox refers to as the direct mechanism. An effective flow of information regarding 
policy outcomes can, for example, empower and equip legislative assemblies and 
executive offices to investigate suspected resource leakage and waste in public 
administration. As Fox observes, this does not guarantee that irregularities will be 
investigated and redressed, but without access to such information, government 
oversight and accountability will be ad hoc at best. Intra-governmental transparency 
allows, in other words, for formal accountability structures and mechanisms to 
perform better, a form of oversight rather akin to police activity in that institutions 
carry out a type of surveillance activity, regularly patrolling administrative offices in 
order to detect abuses (McCubbins and Schwartz 1984). 
A second possible manner in which transparency may enhance the quality of 
government practices refers to more indirect and diffuse mechanisms, involving an 
indeterminate set of actors with weak or no formal capacity to issue and enforce 
sanctions. In contrast to the more direct mechanism, which assumes that government 
agencies act reciprocally as principal and agent for one another, the indirect 
mechanism instead expects the citizenry itself to act as principal seeking to hold 
agents—elected and appointed public officials—accountable. The demos of a polity 
may carry out this role through regular free and fair elections, which is known as 
vertical accountability, or by mobilizing to create an outcry in a specific instance of 
abuse of public power, or by organizing to pressure for reform of public institutions. 
This latter and more indirect mechanism has come to be known as societal 
accountability (Smulovitz and Perruzzotti 2000; Peruzzotti and Smulovitz 2006). A 
considerable number of case studies document that citizens and civil society 
organizations in various local and national contexts in fact can and do succeed in 
bringing abuses to light and inducing institutions with formal accountability power to 
investigate and issue sanctions (see Grimes 2008b for an overview of this research). 
Societal accountability therefore operates when non-state actors sound fire alarms, 
triggering oversight processes to react (McCubbins and Schwartz 1984).3 Nicely 
phrased by Daniel Kaufmann: “Transparency-enhancing mechanisms involving a 
multitude of stakeholders throughout society can be thought as creating millions of 
‘auditors’” (Kaufmann 2004, 21). 
A recent article, published in the New York Times, illustrates how the new 
Indian Right to Information Law can change the way people view the public 
administration, which in turn may have a mobilizing effect and force an ineffective 
                                                 
3 It is important to point out that even if this theorized process attributes the role of principal to non-
state actors, it does not assume unbounded rationality on the part of the public. Societal accountability 
does not imply that the public as principal carries out coordinated actions to ensure seamless 
monitoring and alarm operations. The public cannot act as principal proper even barring problems of 
information asymmetry as citizens lack the ability to punish government agents, with the important but 
still limited exception of regular free and fair elections. The public is also not in most polities, 
however, powerless, as the considerable literature on social movements and societal accountability 
attest. 
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and corrupt bureaucracy to perform better.4 With the new transparency law, people 
have begun to view public officials in India as accountable to the citizens. Prior to the 
enactment of the law, people had few tools or possibilities to hold the government or 
the bureaucracy responsible for wrong-doings or inaction and tended therefore to 
consider public officials as rulers beyond reproach. The article tells the story of 
Chanchala Devi a poor low-caste woman, who applied for financial support from a 
governmental housing program. However, while her richer neighbors received 
financial support to build better houses, she did not receive any support for four years. 
With the help of local activists, she requested information about the processes 
concerning the other decisions, and in a couple of days she received the financial 
support she had applied for. The transparency law has therefore increased the demand 
for government effectiveness and output and , and stimulated the creation of a number 
of systems to evaluate public services (including citizen reports cards, social audits 
and others). These systems and demands may limit the discretionary space of public 
officials and thereby reduce opportunities for corruption (Apaza & Johnston 2009). 
The positive developments witnessed in India are, however, not axiomatic; increased 
transparency may instead breed resignation and passivity among the demos. 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Theorized long-term positive effects of transparency on good government. 
 
The indirect mechanism, while arguably plausible, contains a host of assumptions 
regarding public reactions to the newly acquired information. As Figure 1 illustrates, 
increased transparency must incite public indignation and protest, which may then be 
channeled into movements pressuring for investigation of abuses or for institutional 
reform. This pressure must be sufficiently well orchestrated and noticeable to prompt 
actors with formal powers to react and implement measures to address or redress 
problems. Reform efforts may include further improving the transparency of the 
                                                 
4 Polgreen, Lydia. Right-to-Know Law Gives India’s Poor a Lever. New York Times. 28 June 2010. 
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workings of the public sector, i.e. a virtuous cycle of transparency, accountability and 
institutional reform that ultimately improves quality of government and institutional 
trust.  
Several of the elements in this theorized spiral have support in empirical research, 
not least in the studies of societal accountability mentioned above. That non-state 
actors can play an instrumental role in bringing about institutional reform has been 
documented, though analyses suggest that bringing about any institutional reform is 
far from a simple affair. Less is known, however, about the effects of transparency on 
the first links of this chain, i.e. how citizens and civil society react to an increased 
availability of information related to government activities. The aim of the analyses 
presented here is to explore precisely these issues: does transparency incite 
indignation and empower citizens to take action? Or does a flood of information 
instead confirm citizens’ worst suspicions and give rise to resentment and 
resignation? Transparency may, in other words, have a disempowering effect, 
cultivating a desire to withdraw from political matters and the public sphere. In order 
to explore these issues, the analyses below explore the effect of transparency on 
citizens’ institutional trust as well as on civil society activity in the country.  
 
 
Transparency and Institutional Trust 
Institutional trust is a conceptual subcomponent of political trust. Political trust refers 
to institutions on both the input and output sides of the political systems. In other 
words, political trust can mean trust in politicians as well as trust in implementing 
public agencies (Rothstein & Stolle 2007). Political trust can vary depending on 
specific support for the rulers at any given time. Trust in institutions is, in 
comparison, more stable as public institutions remain to a greater extent unaffected by 
political colors (Rothstein & Stolle 2007). A decrease in institutional trust may 
therefore signal a more substantial fluctuation in state legitimacy (Lühiste 2006; 
Hetherington 1998; Miller and Listhaug 1999).  
The few empirical studies that examine the effect of transparency on institutional 
trust have produced rather mixed results, suggesting there is cause for more tempered 
expectations. Two recent experimental studies examine whether citizens gain 
confidence in decision-making authorities under conditions of greater transparency 
(De Fine Licht 2010; Grimmelikhuijsen 2010). Both used manipulations in which 
respondents either received cursory descriptions of a decision-making process, or 
more detailed information. Both studies found that more information about the 
decision process tended to undermine the perceived trustworthiness of decision 
makers and the decision-making process. Both studies were conducted in and referred 
to contexts generally rated high on country comparisons of quality of government: 
Sweden (De Fine Licht 2010) and Holland (Grimmelikhuijsen 2010). The results 
suggest that even in contexts relatively free from egregious problems of inefficiency 
and lack of rule of law, citizens have unduly high expectations of the policy process, 
overestimating the competence, rationality, and perhaps also the level of ethical 
enlightenment of decision makers. Increased transparency may, in other words, reveal 
to citizens that policy making operates under the same cognitive and resource 
constraints that characterized human decision-making more generally (Stone 2001).  
To date, however, no studies have examined how the level of transparency in a 
polity affects institutional confidence at the aggregate level. Transparency advocates 
proclaim that disclosure will cultivate institutional trust, while the results of 
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experimental research suggest that increased transparency instead will undermine 
institutional trust. Considering that both normative theories or experimental research 
belie the messiness of political reality, we hypothesize that the effect of transparency 
on trust will not be constant but rather vary depending on other attributes of the 
country, in particular on the level of corruption in the country and the avenues 
available to citizens to mobilize, express discontent, and effect institutional change. 
We suggest, in other words that two conditions can influence the confidence building 
effect of transparency: the actual prevalence of corruption in a country, as well as the 
existence of voice opportunities.5 In countries with comparatively weak rule of law 
and government, transparency may have deleterious effects on institutional trust for 
two interrelated reasons: transparency can influence institutional trust 1) by exposing 
institutions rife with venality, or 2) by raising expectations for additional reform that 
may not be forthcoming. Transparency, as suggested by Roberts (2006), can 
illuminate the dark sides of governance, such as institutional failures or public rulings 
that are perceived as unfair. With respect to the second point, accountability reforms 
and laws on public participation often take much longer to implement than freedom of 
information laws. The World Bank, for instance, acknowledges that transparency 
often leads to greater public awareness of misconduct by public officials without the 
necessary decrease in malpractices in the short run.6 
A decrease in institutional trust under these circumstances may be a sign that 
transparency does what it is suppose to do, i.e. provoke public reactions to abuses of 
power. Under such circumstances, decreased institutional trust may represent a 
needed corrective, a sound response that may ultimately lead to institutional reforms 
as suggested in Figure 1. However, a decrease in trust is not unambiguously good for 
long-term reform. One ambiguity of institutional trust as an impetus for institutional 
change is whether reductions in institutional trust represent constructive indignation 
that can be channeled into an inclination to act and promote institutional change, or 
whether it represents resignation and thereby an inclination to withdraw from political 
matters or even reinforce destructive patterns in society (such as increasing an 
inclination to participate in corrupt acts).  
The second reason that transparency may erode institutional trust is by feeding a 
demand for and creating expectations regarding institutional reform that then go 
unheeded. Transparency may increase demand for additional anti-corruption 
measures, and if a polity lacks the basic institutional arrangements for citizens to 
express this discontent, frustration and distrust may follow. A related argument about 
transparency can also be made that the more information is made publicly available, 
the more information the public demands in order to lift doubts about secretive 
government (cf Van Waarden 2006). Freedoms of information laws are thus only one 
small piece of the puzzle to restore trust in political institutions. Unless transparency 
reforms are accompanied by other anti-corruption measures, transparency may do 
more harm than good with respect to citizens’ confidence in public institutions. 
Without the enabling conditions for citizens to take advantage of such laws to 
influence policies that they disagree with, transparency will do little to establish trust 
                                                 
5 In our empirical analyses we use national aggregates of individual attitudes to study effects on 
country-level. How a change on country-level, in terms of increased transparency, affects individual or 
micro attitudes, which in turn has effects on aggregate country-level estimates.  
6 http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/decentralization/admin.htm#4  
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(Frost 2003).7 In sum, exposing institutions and raising expectation about their 
performance without corresponding institutional reforms may decrease institutional 
trust.  
While low trust and public discontent may represent a healthy response to 
transparency reforms and a necessary step in a longer-term reform process, these 
effects need to be understood in order to set realistic expectations on transparency 
reforms as well as to shed light on how different types of government reforms relate 
to and affect each other and society at large.  
 
Transparency and Civic Engagement 
Institutional trust or more precisely a lack of institutional trust may, as mentioned 
above, be an expression of indignation and therefore an impetus to exercise the voice 
option, or an expression of resignation and an inclination to exit the political and 
public sphere to the extent possible.8 The second dependent variable – civic 
engagement – is included to attempt to mitigate this ambiguity.  
As Figure 1 suggests, an increase in transparency, in particular in countries with 
comparatively high levels of corruption, may incite citizens to action in an effort to 
redress the abuses that have become observable. Jonathan Fox and colleagues 
document how peasant organizations use a newly enacted access to information law in 
Mexico to hold public offices accountable (Fox, García Jiménez and Haight 2009), 
suggesting that increased transparency may indeed empower civil society. Similarly, 
Goetz and Jenkins document a number of successful accounts of NGOs in India using 
transparency laws to bringing abuses of public power to light (Goetz and Jenkins 
2005).  
The transformative power of transparency laws such as access to information 
legislation lies not only in citizens’ increased capacity to observe misdeeds but also to 
secure evidence to substantiate them. Even in contexts with considerable secrecy 
surrounding public affairs, citizens may witness strong indications of 
misappropriation of funds, not least if public officials live well beyond the means of a 
reasonable salary. Acts of embezzlement may be nearly impossible to prove, however, 
without access to information regarding, for example, exact salaries or budget 
allocations to specific public projects or works. Transparency can, in other words, 
equip civil society with the needed means to investigate and substantiate suspected 
abuses, a key element of societal accountability actions, and therefore act as an 
incentive for greater civic engagement. 
 
Concepts and measures 
This paper focuses on the micro foundations through which transparency can 
influence the quality of government institutions. We suggests , in concurrence with 
the  definition highlighted by Florini (1999), that transparency is “the release of 
information by institutions that is relevant to evaluating those institutions.” This 
definition suggests that transparency is related to accountability. However, some 
definitions of transparency conflate transparency and accountability and thereby 
                                                 
7 Such conditions include accountability reforms, such that transparency can lead to changes in 
government behaviour, as well as laws on public participation, so as to allow for input by citizens in 
public policies. In the words of Schumann (2007:856), “Transparency reforms may often usher in a 
democracy of access but not necessarily the democratization of decision-making. It potentially 
obfuscates as much as it illuminates.”  
8 Retaining a high level of trust would correspond to ‘loyalty’, the third strategy outlined by Albert 
Hirschman (1970). 
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become unsuitable for operationalizations. The divergence in definitions most likely 
results from the wide applicability of the term, where studies of transparency can be 
found in such varying fields as international security (Florini 2002), regime 
effectiveness (Mitchell 1998), and negotiation theory (Stasavage 2004).  
The lack of agreement in measures of government transparency for cross 
country research is surprising given that we have a number of widely used and 
accepted measures for other complex and multifaceted terms, such as corruption and 
democracy. Several developments of these measures are underway.9 To date, the only 
comprehensive measures of government transparency with wide country coverage 
that we are aware of is a World Bank index of transparency10 that measures 
transparency with two different indices:  the economic and institutional transparency 
index and political transparency index. Both these indices are aggregate indexes. The 
economic and institutional transparency index includes indicators of access to 
information laws, transparency of policy and the public sector, transparency of the 
budget process, the publication of economic data and e-government. The political 
transparency index contains indicators of freedom of speech, political competition, 
press freedom and regulations concerning disclosure of political funding. In this paper 
we chose to include only the economic and institutional transparency index as a 
measure of government transparency. Using Lindstedt and Naurin’s (2010) 
terminology, the type of transparency that we are interested in is agent controlled 
transparency, and since the political transparency index contains larger elements of 
non-agent controlled transparency, such as freedom of the press and political 
competition, these measures fall outside our conceptualization of government 
transparency.  
To explore whether an increase in government transparency might enable 
greater societal accountability and reduce corruption, we focus on two different 
dependent variables: institutional trust and civic engagement. Institutional trust and 
civic engagement, we argue, represent two important micro foundations for 
institutional change. This approach enables us to explore two of the variables often 
implicitly or explicitly associated with an increased government transparency and 
increased demand for improved government performance, although this relationship 
remains an assumption.  
Our measure of institutional trust is based on the country mean of individual 
responses to a question from the World Values Survey wave 4 (1999-2002). The 
respondents are asked about their trust in the civil service, and choose from 
alternatives ranging from “none at all” to “ a great deal.” 
The data on the number of civil society organizations in each country comes 
from CIVICUS, a global network of civil society organizations active in the area of 
social and economic development. The CIVICUS directory is compiled for the 
development community and does not purport to be an exhaustive register of all 
organizations. Organizations may themselves ask to be included but otherwise are 
identified primarily through public sources and the internet. One way of validating the 
data compiled from the directory is by comparing it to the results of a comprehensive 
analysis conducted at the Johns Hopkins University Center for Civil Society Studies 
of a much smaller subset of countries (Salamon, Sokolowski and List 2003). Though 
the latter employs a broader definition of civil society and measures civil society as 
                                                 
9 For an alternative measure of transparency focusing on bureaucrats’ support for transparency see 
Bauhr and Nasiritousi (2010) . 
10 The index is still under construction (Bellvar & Kaufmann 2005) 
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the proportion a country’s workforce active in civil society, the Johns Hopkins and 
CIVICUS measures correlate respectably (Pearson’s r=0.63, p<0.001, N=35). Much 
as with institutional trust, numerous social, political and economic factors may shape 
civil society activity in a country. These include the extent to which a country is 
democratic and free of political oppression, as well as the extent to which civil 
liberties are honored in the country. The analyses therefore take these factors into 
account when examining the effect of transparency on civic engagement.  
Our model suggests that two factors condition the influence of government 
transparency on institutional trust: what transparency reveals (exposure effect) and 
possibilities to do something about it (agency / accountability effect). The measure we 
use to capture the exposure effect is the control of corruption index of the World Bank 
Governance Indicators. The indicator is based on a combination of data from both 
citizen and expert perceptions of corruption, covering several aspects of the 
phenomenon, such as for example the frequency of “additional payments to get things 
done” to perceptions of grand corruption among political elites. In order to capture 
whether there is an agency / accountability11 effect we use the Economist Intelligence 
Unit democracy index, which covers different parts of democratic rule, such as for 
example whether there are free and fair elections and whether citizens enjoy civil 
liberties.  
Before turning to the empirical analyses, a brief note on the concept of 
institutional trust is in order. Trust has long been recognized as playing a central role 
in political, economic and social relations.12 Trust facilitates interactions between 
citizens and allows for more efficient transactions between government and the 
governed (Mishler & Rose 2001). Low levels of political trust have been linked to a 
range of societal ills, including tax evasion (Hayoz & Hug 2007) and weak 
democratic fabrics in societies (Morrone et al 2009; Braithwaite & Levi 1998). On a 
theoretical level, authors have converged on a definition of trust for an institution or 
actor. Trust is a belief that the institution or actor, whose actions may affect one’s 
interests or well-being, will behave in accordance with implicit or explicit terms set 
by agreed upon rules or norms, established conventions, or stated intent. Trust 
presumes some level of knowledge about the entity upon which trust is conferred, 
even if that knowledge is generic or systemic and not specific to the entity in question 
(e.g. one might trust an obscure public office in Sweden because one trusts the 
accountability mechanisms in the system as a whole).  
Empirical analyses of institutional trust indicate, in contrast, that trust as an 
empirical phenomenon is inordinately broad and that trust for any specific institution 
may build on factors ranging from evaluations of institutional performance and the 
perceived fairness with which the institution makes decisions (Grimes 2006), to 
mistaken inference (Hardin 1999), personal disposition or political socialization 
(Jennings et al 2001), or culture and zeitgeist (Inglehart 1997). In a political system in 
which information regarding policy deliberations and operations is scarce or lacking 
altogether, citizens’ sentiments toward government may reasonably build to a larger 
extent on disinformation provided by the government itself, or on factors exogenous 
                                                 
11 In our model, political competition is a condition that may mediate the influence of government 
transparency on institutional trust, as illustrated by our “expectiation/ disillusionment” mechanisms 
12 For example, Confucius identified trust, food and weapons as being crucial to government (Newton 
2007). 
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to the political sphere.13 Trust can therefore mean different things in different 
contexts, and have very different implications for the political system depending on 
the specific nature of its micro-foundations. 
The disagreement regarding what, in reality, political trust builds on has 
consequences for normative discussions of political trust as well. On the one hand, 
declining trust for political institutions may indicate mounting dissatisfaction with 
government and a growing unwillingness to defer to its authority (Norris 1999). On 
the other, several authors have raised the question of whether a high level of political 
trust is desirable since democracy and accountability, to thrive in the long run, require 
a critical and citizenry (Hardin 1999). These two positions can largely be reconciled 
by introducing the variable of whether or not political trust builds on knowledge of 
and information about the institutions themselves. Informed and satisfied citizens may 
be normatively desirable for democracy while uninformed and satisfied citizens may 
not. This discussion cannot be developed in a meaningful way until we know more 
about when and how political trust builds on knowledge of and assessments of the 
political system and its operations. The empirical explorations below seek to make a 
contribution in this discussion as well.14 
These discussions suggest a number of control variables. First of all, we control 
for economic development since economic development is frequently used as a 
powerful determinant of the effects of government transparency. Furthermore, 
institutional trust can be affected by whether people are satisfied with the outcome 
from the political system, such as for example whether it generates economic 
growth.15 Another plausible outcome variable is educational opportunities in the 
country. We use a measure of number of university students per 100,000 inhabitants 
in order to study whether education as an outcome variable has any effect on 
institutional trust.16 
Our second control variable is societal post materialism, which is typically seen 
as a powerful determinant of institutional trust. Post materialist values are claimed to 
generate a general aversion towards authority, which create lower levels of trust in for 
example political institutions (Inglehart 1999). We control for societal post 
                                                 
13 Theories on what political trust builds on are typically divided into two dimensions depending on the 
extent to which explanations for political trust are endogenous or exogenous to political institutions. 
Cultural theories view trust as exogenous, a basic character trait learned early in life (Mishler and Rose 
2001: 33) Institutional theories, in contrast, emphasize that political trust and distrust are endogenous, 
even rational responses by individuals to the performance of institutions (Mishler and Rose 2001:36, 
March, 1988; North, 1990). Institutional theories disagree, however, on which aspects of government 
performance are important and how performance is assessed (Mishler and Rose 2001:36). Studies that 
have attempted to explain the decrease in trust in various countries have identified factors such as 
corruption (Lühiste 2006; Anderson & Tverdova 2003; Chang & Chu 2006; Job 2005; Mishler & Rose 
2001), the media’s attention to scandals (Blind 2006; Robinson 1976) and policy performance, 
including especially economic performance (Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibab,&Limongi, 1996). This 
latter issue – perceptions of political and economic progress of a country (or lack thereof) – has been 
identified as a major determinant of institutional trust (Lühiste 2006; Mishler & Rose 2001). According 
to Mishler and Rose’s analysis (2001:52): "This indicates that the effects of macro performance are 
largely mediated through micro evaluations; aggregate corruption does corrode political trust, but only 
to the extent that individuals perceive corruption and ascribe it importance relative to other concerns." 
14 In a way, this study thereby contributes to evaluate the institutional explanation for political trust. 
Institutional explanations contend that institutional trust is based on citizens’ evaluations of political 
institutions (cf Mishler and Rose 2001) and not only on cultural explanations. 
15 We use the Gleditsch data of real GDP which is based on estimates reported by the IMF. 
16 This measure is from Vanhanen’s index of power resources. It is lagged by 10 years, so it is actually 
a measure of university student per 100 000 inhabitants 10 years ago. 
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materialism using the mean value of aggregated individual values received from the 
World Values Survey.17  
The third control variable is political terror. Survey questions regarding 
institutional trust can be sensitive to levels of political terror. In some regimes the 
respondents might not be willing to state their distrust in fear of reprisals. 
 
Analyses and Results  
The analyses presented below explore key components of the theoretical model that 
claims that transparency enhances good government. How does the opportunity to 
observe the state affect citizens’ reactions to and views of the state? Do these 
reactions tend toward indignation or resignation, and do they depend on the 
prevalence of corruption and levels of democracy in the country? Though the 
contention that transparency increases citizens’ confidence in governing institutions 
has considerable purchase in international policy discourses, it is certainly disputable 
on theoretical grounds that transparency per se will enhance institutional confidence 
irrespective of the nature of the activities exposed. Evidence revealing or supporting 
suspicions of corruption—or, for that matter, extreme inefficiency or other departures 
from shared norms and principles—would enhance institutional confidence. The first 
set of analyses explore these issues. The second set turn to a question raised and left 
unresolved in the first set of analyses: can the fall in trust that seems to follow from 
greater transparency in comparatively corrupt countries suggest a swell of indignation 
that might constitute a force of reform, or does the decline in political trust instead 
signal resignation and an inclination to withdraw from the political sphere. The results 
presented below build on OLS regression of 74 countries. First, the influence of 
transparency on discontent, measured as institutional trust, is explored, followed by an 
analysis of the influence of transparency on active civic engagement.  
 
Transparency and institutional trust 
Government reforms to curb corruption are typically expected to enhance trust in 
institutions; the findings of the analyses presented below suggest, however, that 
increasing transparency does not provide a simple lever to pull in order to cultivate 
trust in public institutions. A fairly strong and positive correlation (r = 0.68) supports 
the theoretical contention that transparency is conducive to improving the control of 
corruption; transparency, in contrast, correlates only weakly with confidence for 
public institutions. Counter to normative claims, opening the shutters on the windows 
of the political system does not alone seem to induce confidence in public institutions.  
The first set of analyses examines the main effects of both quality of 
government and transparency on institutional trust in a multivariate model (Table 1). 
The main effects (Model 1), concur with the findings of previous research in showing 
that control of corruption constitutes a substantively important component of 
institutional confidence (cf. Chang & Chu 2006; Anderson & Tverdova 2003; 
Selingson 2002). This correlation does not seem to be a simple reflection of 
satisfaction with other circumstances in the country, such as the overall economic 
well being of the country or availability of educational opportunities. Even under 
                                                 
17 The measure is based on four items. The respondents have to give priority to two out of four political 
statements 1.“Maintaining the order of the nation”,2. “Giving people more say in important 
government decisions”, 3.”Fighting rising prices” 4.“Protecting freedom of speech”. Priority to 
statement 2 and statement 4 is claimed to capture a post material value orientation.  
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control for these factors, citizens in countries with lower levels of corruption feel 
more confidence in public institutions than in countries with higher levels of 
corruption.  
Transparency, in contrast, seems to influence institutional trust in the opposite 
direction. While most other measures of good government typically have a positive 
influence on institutional trust, transparency seems to have a slightly detrimental 
effect on citizens’ willingness to defer to public institutions, though the pattern is 
rather weak and not sufficiently consistent to be statistically significant. How can we 
understand this seemingly paradoxical situation in which two attributes of good 
governance – control of corruption and government transparency – affect institutional 
trust so differently? 
The logic of principal agent theory suggests that one of the main reasons for 
implementing transparency reforms is that it allows the principals to better monitor 
the agents (Besley 2006). If transparency works according to the model illustrated in 
Figure 1, it seems reasonable to expect that the effect of increased transparency on 
public confidence would depend on what citizens see when allowed greater scope of 
insight into the workings and machinations of the political process. Model 2 therefore 
explores whether the degree of transparency in a country has a greater or lesser effect 
on institutional trust depending on whether the country has high or low levels of 
corruption.  
In order to explore the exposure effect hypothesis, countries are categorized by 
levels of corruption.18 The estimates of model 2 provide quite strong indications that 
an increase in transparency may in fact erode citizens’ trust in public institutions 
when venality is prevalent in those institutions. In the group of comparatively more 
corrupt countries, the effect of opening up the political system to public scrutiny has a 
negative and substantively considerable impact on institutional trust. As the measure 
of transparency in this category of countries spans a 3.5 point scale, the difference in 
mean institutional trust between the least and most transparent countries is -0.8 on the 
four point trust scale.  
In countries with comparatively higher levels of quality of government, 
however, levels of transparency have no bearing on institutional trust whatsoever. 
This finding confirms our expectation that the exposure of government institutions 
may have different effects in different contexts. In particular, the findings support the 
exposure effect discussed above, and also suggest that transparency may be less 
important for institutional trust in contexts that are historically and firmly rooted in 
relatively well functioning government institutions. The findings are robust and stand 
even once factors such as real GDP per capita, levels of state political terror, access to 
higher education, and aggregate levels of post materialism in the country are taken 
into account.19 
                                                 
18 This categorization is of course a necessary but artificial construction as regardless of how we choose 
to measure or define corruption, it is impossible to classify some polities as corrupt and others as non-
corrupt. As the World Values Survey, the only comparative study of levels of institutional trust, only 
covers 74 countries, the categorization was adjusted in order to sort the countries in to groups of 
approximately equal size, rather than using the mean as a cut off point. 
19 It is possible that countries with more transparent government institutions might also foster greater 
public interest in political affairs, which in turn might lead to a more critical citizenry. This does not, 
however, seem to account for the effects reported in model 2. Even controlling for levels of political 
interest in the country, the negative relationship between increased transparency and institutional trust 
remains in countries with comparatively higher levels of corruption. 
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Table 1. The Influence of Government Transparency on Institutional Trust 
 
Model 1  
B (β) 
 
Model 2  
B (β) 
 
Model 3  
B (β) 
 
Constant .94 .80 2.00*** 
    
Economic and institutional transparency -.10 (-.27)   
     In corrupt countries  -.23 (-.62)**  
     In non-corrupt countries  .07 (.01)  
     In democracies   .06 (-.05) 
     In non-democracies   -.20 (-.51)** 
    
Democracy (Dummy)   -.24 (-.36) 
Control of Corruption (Dummy) .17 (.52)** .22 (.33)**  
    
Control of Corruption (Estimate)   .20 (.72)** 
Political Terror Scale .09 (.27) .07 (.22) .12 (.40)* 
Post-materialism -.31 (-.20) -.30 (-.19) -.46 (-.30)* 
GDP (ln) .04 (.30) .04 (.30) 0. (0)  
Share of students 0 (-.32)* 0 (-.34)**  
    
N 71 71 72 
Adj. R2 .12 .18 .16 
Comment: * p<.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
 
The second hypothesis regarding the relationship between transparency and 
institutional trust states that the way in which increased transparency effects citizens’ 
institutional trust may depend on the extent to which those citizens have the 
possibility to act to address any observed shortcomings in the political system. 
Ultimately, a citizens’ possibilities to effect change in the political system is a factor 
of numerous parameters, including resources at the individual level, incentives to 
mobilize, and the openness of the political system and availability of channels through 
which to seek to bring about change. This analysis presents a preliminary exploration 
of this hypothesis using a more coarse but undeniably essential measure of 
possibilities of citizens influence, namely whether free and fair elections are held and 
the level of political freedoms in the country (measure by the Economist Intelligence 
Unit).  
When interacted with levels of transparency, the findings reveal a similar pattern 
to those observed in models 1 and 2. An increase in transparency in non-democratic 
countries tends to erode institutional trust, whereas differences in levels of 
transparency in comparatively more democratic polities instead have little or no 
bearing on institutional trust.20 
                                                 
20 Interestingly enough, however, the average levels of institutional trust seem to be lower in more 
established democracies than in countries with weaker democratic institutions.  
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In sum, both of the factors hypothesized to affect the relationship between 
transparency and institutional trust in fact seem to be at work. Increasing transparency 
in highly corrupt systems, as well as in political systems that offer only limited 
opportunities to effect change both seem to undermine citizens’ confidence in public 
institutions. It should be noted, however, that while not identical, the categorizations 
of low and high corruption overlap somewhat with the categorizations of weak and 
established democracies. These two mechanisms are, in other words, rather difficult to 
explore completely independently of one another, and even on an individual level the 
micro-foundations may be intimately intertwined. Greater insight into the working of 
a political system may induce a similar sense of disillusionment both as a result of the 
magnitude of the challenge of changing a system rife with corruption, as well as from 
an acute awareness of the limited prospects of bringing about change due to electoral 
manipulations or truncated political freedoms. On a theoretical level, however, these 
two are quite distinct and merit further investigation.  
The empirical results confirming the theorized exposure effect indicate that trust 
may build on evaluations of public institutions to a greater or lesser extent depending 
on the availability of information. In this sense, the results shed light on one aspect of 
the micro-foundations of institutional trust. It may not be possible to determine to 
what extent political trust builds on assessments as this varies by country. A second 
issue regarding the micro-foundations of trust remains unresolved, however, namely 
whether a loss of trust signals indignation or resignation.  
 
Transparency and civic engagement 
In order to shed light on this second issue, this section explores whether transparency 
promotes not only an attitudinal reaction to low quality government and a 
disillusionment over the possibility to influence them, but also incites active civic 
engagement. If attitudinal disapproval is coupled with more active forms of 
engagement, then it strengthens the interpretation that the distrust resulting from 
greater transparency is indignation rather than purely resignation. The analysis uses 
one measure of public activism, namely the vibrancy of its civil society as measured 
by the number of civil society organizations in the country relative to size of its 
population. 
The models in table two examine the effect of increased transparency on civic 
engagement in countries with different levels of corruption.  Model 1 first shows the 
main effects of transparency and corruption on civic engagement. While levels of 
corruption do not seem to correlate with civic engagement, increased transparency 
does correlate positively with measures of civic engagement. Moreover, this effect of 
transparency on civic engagement is slightly stronger in countries with comparatively 
higher levels of corruption, as indicated in model 2. In terms of the long term effects 
of transparency for political development, these results are encouraging. Even in 
comparatively more corrupt polities, a greater degree of transparency tends to be 
associated with a more vibrant civil society than less transparent countries, an effect 
that stands even once factors such as real GDP and the prevalence of political 
imprisonment and state brutality are taken into consideration. Rather than 
demobilizing, an increasing openness in a political system, even one rife with 
corruption, seems instead to have a mobilizing effect.  
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Table 2. The Influence of Government Transparency on Civic Engagement 
 
Model 1  
B (β) 
 
Model 2 
 B (β) 
 
Constant  171.60*** 
   
Transparency 6.72 (.24)*  
    Corrupt countries  8.36 (.30)* 
    Non-corrupt countries  4.85 (.20) 
 
Control of Corruption (Dummy)  -18.31 (-.37)*** 
Political Terror Scale .19  (.01) -.66 (-.03) 
GDP (ln) -6.0 (-.6)*** -6.30 (-.63)*** 
Control of Corruption (Estimate) 3.09 (.13) 11.50 (.47)*** 
Civil liberties -.58 (-.04)  
   
N 168 168 
Adj. R2 .20 .24 
Comment: †p=.11, * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
 
 
More transparent polities may also show a stronger inclination to honor citizens’ civil 
liberties, which may also allow civil society to flourish. We therefore also controlled 
for the Freedom House measure of civil liberties, which captures freedom of 
expression and belief, as well as associational and organizational rights. The effects 
observed in model 2 do to some extent seem to be a reflection of civil rights, but not 
entirely. Once civil rights are controlled for in the model (results not shown), 
openness still retains a positive relationship with the density of civil society 
organizations in the country, although the relationship is only marginally significant 
(p=0.11).  
Taken together, the models in Table 2 suggest that, at the level of micro-
foundations, transparency may have a mobilizing rather than a disempowering effect 
on political activity. One important caveat is in order, however. The measure of civil 
society density counts the number of development related civil society organizations 
in the country. While some of these organizations may engage in societal 
accountability and perhaps also engage in advocacy work for the political 
development of the polity, others and perhaps the larger portion may instead work 
exclusively with service provision. Service providing civil society organizations – 
while perhaps essential to the social and economic well-being of those individuals 
served – may not constitute a transformative force with respect to the political 
development of a country. To the extent that civil society organizations successfully 
provide services needed by citizens, a vibrant civil society may instead represent a 
forced or voluntary expression of exit, opting out of public endeavors and may instead 
abate the pressure for government reform. The results of a previous study support the 
interpretation that the civic engagement represents voice rather exit, however. Using 
the same measure of civic engagement, that analysis found that the civil society 
vibrancy had a positive relationship to a reduction in corruption between 1996 and 
2008 (Grimes 2008a).  
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Concluding Discussion 
This article explores how transparency can influence institutions, in suggesting that 
transparency influences two factors that potentially drive changes towards better 
government institutions: attitudinal discontent and active engagement. Our analyses 
show that government transparency can influence both citizens’ attitudes, as measured 
by institutional trust, and citizen mobilization, as measured by the number of civil 
society organizations in the country relative to size of its population. In countries with 
comparatively higher levels of corruption, greater transparency reduces institutional 
trust and enhances civic engagement. Our analysis also shows that the influence of 
transparency on institutional trust is determined by two central conditions, the 
exposure effect and the accountability effect.  
Our findings provide preliminary support for the principal agent model of 
transparency, in which transparency is used by the principal to monitor the agent, 
rather than a more normatively oriented model of transparency in which transparency 
reforms signal a commitment to improve government institutions and thereby increase 
trust and confidence that the government will deal with its problems internally. The 
logic of principal agent theory suggests that because the interests of agents and 
principals may diverge, principals must find ways of monitoring the actions taken by 
agents. Transparency could reduce this asymmetric information problem by shedding 
light on whether the agent (i.e. the government) is pursuing goals that are in the 
interest of principals (i.e. its citizens) effectively and efficiently (Besley 2006; Florini 
2002: 14-15). In other words, transparency could aid in overcoming the principal-
agent problem by providing principals with information about actions taken by the 
agent on their behalf, which could be used to judge whether their interests are being 
served by the agent. Transparency can thus lead to good governance both by 
encouraging good public policy-making and by deterring abuses and mistakes by 
officials (Cary 2009). While more research is needed, our findings lend support to the 
theoretical claims that increasing transparency will provoke a reaction from citizens, 
and that this reaction can be conducive to institutional development in the long run. 
In expounding the model that links transparency to good government via the 
mechanism of societal accountability, we have also added theoretically and 
empirically to discussions of the influence of transparency on institutional trust. 
Contrary to what is often suggested by advocates of transparency, our results show 
that transparency does not automatically improve institutional trust. Under some 
circumstances, transparency can even reduce institutional trust. In particular we 
suggest two conditions under which this may occur: when corrupt systems are 
exposed publicly and when citizens do not see a political way to influence institutions. 
The exposure and accountability effect does not work equally across contexts, 
however. Increased transparency does not seem to increase institutional trust when 
institutions are good. This finding supports previous arguments about how the balance 
of what the public values shift at higher levels of institutional quality.  
The results reported here indicate that transparency may be positive in the sense 
that it allows for a corrective of sorts of political trust. With little transparency, 
corruption may go unpunished both formally and in the court of public opinion. In 
corrupt countries with little transparency, comparatively high levels of trust may 
result either from disinformation or because expressions of institutional trust build on 
factors other than assessments of the institutions themselves. These findings suggest 
that transparency can alter the micro-foundations of institutional trust so that they to a 
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greater extent build on evaluation as opposed to affect or world view. Nonetheless, 
even institutional trust that has evaluative foundations may both be an expression of 
resignation or of indignation, the latter of which may constitute a pressure for political 
and institutional reform. The lower institutional trust observed in corrupt countries 
with relatively greater transparency may, but does not necessarily, offer a promise of 
long-term political development, as distrust and discontent can serve as an impetus to 
monitor, mobilize, and generate pressure for the development of more impartial 
public institutions. If the micro-foundations of the observed negative effect of 
transparency on institutional trust are instead disillusionment and a sense of 
powerlessness, then increasing transparency too early in the political development of 
a country may in fact produce a crisis of credibility of a more unproductive kind, one 
which demobilizes rather than mobilizes citizens to action. These issues warrant 
additional research, not least because of their substantial policy implications. 
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